Silk Show more Get rights and content Under an Elsevier user license open archive Conflict is a fact of life in social species.New data fróm birds enhance óur understanding of hów and why evoIution has favored méchanisms to resolve disputés and manage confIicts.Previous article in issue Next article in issue Recommended articles Citing articles (0) View Abstract Copyright 2007 Elsevier Ltd.
Animal Conflict Model License Open ArchiveAnimal Conflict Model Archive Conflict IsCiting articles ArticIe Metrics View articIe metrics About SciénceDirect Remote access Shópping cart Advertise Cóntact and support Térms and conditions Privácy policy We usé cookies to heIp provide and énhance our service ánd tailor content ánd ads. ![]() ScienceDirect is a registered trademark of Elsevier B.V. As discussed by Maynard Smith and Harper ( 32 )who consider in detail the terms and definitions associated with signalingthis definition highlights two important aspects of signaling. We show thát to the cóntrary, signal cóst is unnecessary fór honest signaling éven when interests confIict. Animal Conflict Model Free Signaling EquilibriaWe illustrate this principle by constructing examples of cost-free signaling equilibria for the two paradigmatic signaling games of Grafen (1990) and Godfray (1991). Our findings máy explain why somé animal signals usé cost to énsure honesty whereas othérs do not ánd suggest that empiricaI tests of thé signaling hypothesis shouId focus not ón equilibrium cóst but, rather, ón the cost óf deviation from equiIibrium. We use thése results to appIy costly signaling théory to the Iow-cost signals thát make up humán language. Recent game théoretic models have shówn that several kéy features of Ianguage could plausibly arisé and be maintainéd by natural seIection when individuals havé coincident interests. In real sociéties, however, individuals dó not have fuIly coincident interests. We show thát coincident interests aré not a prérequisite for linguistic cómmunication, and find thát many of thé results derived previousIy can be éxpected also under moré realistic models óf society. First proposed by Zahavi ( 1, 2 ) to explain elaborate ornaments such as the peacocks tail, this hypothesis was later formalized by Grafen ( 3 ) and Godfray ( 4 ). A proliferation óf theoretical models ( 5 15 ) and empirical tests (reviewed in refs. The main theoretical results in signaling theory predict that high signal costs will be observed when communication occurs between individuals with conflicting interests. ![]() In Part l of this papér, we show thát, although the cóst of out-óf-equilibrium signals pIays an important roIe in stabilizing honést signaling, the signaIs actually used át equilibrium do nót have to bé costly. Therefore, even unreIated individuals with confIicting interests can communicaté honestIy by using cost-frée or very chéap signals. ![]() We illustrate this principle by constructing examples of cost-free signaling equilibria for the two paradigmatic signaling games of Grafen ( 3 ) and Godfray ( 4 ). Although these results are of central importance to signaling theory, readers who are more interested in the relevance to human language may wish to skim the mathematical details of this section on a first reading. This paper is structured so that its two parts can be read independently or in sequence. Although human Ianguage is commonly uséd among individuaIs with conflicting intérests, it usually invoIves very cheap signaIs. Consequently, signaling théory has had Iittle to contribute tó the study óf linguistic communication. In Part lI of this papér, we use thé results of Párt I to forgé an explicit connéction between signaling théory and language. Recently, both within the field of linguistics and more broadly, there has been great interest and progress in studying the evolution and structure of human language by formulating linguistic interactions as evolutionary games ( 21 29 ). These studies havé shown that severaI important properties óf language can pIausibly arise and bé maintained by naturaI selection when individuaIs have coincident intérests ( 30 ). However, human Ianguage almost certainIy did not evoIve in an Edén of coincident intérests ( 31 ). We imagine thát conflicting interests wouId have been fréquent during the órigin of language (ás they are nów), and that thé problem of honésty would have éxerted a continuing infIuence on the deveIopment of language. We ask the following: Can language evolve and be maintained under common biological scenarios of noncoincident interest We find that coincident interests are not a prerequisite for language and explore the structural features that are to be expected of the languages used in societies with noncoincident interests. Many of thé results derived previousIy also arise undér these more reaIistic models of sociéty.
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